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The Short Report Series on Locally Managed Irrigation is designed to disseminate concise 
information on the role of local management in irrigation and irrigation management transfer 
or turnover experiences and policies. The Series is distributed worldwide to a broad range of 
people-policymakers,  planners, researchers, donors and officials in both public and nongov- 
ernmental organizations-who are concerned with the irrigated agriculture sector. The goal 
of the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) is not to promote policies such as 
irrigation management transfer, but to enhance the knowledge base available to decision 
makers and advisors as they face questions of policy adoption and strategies for implementa- 
tion. 
The title of the Series was recently revised due to suggestions from Network members who 
saw the need to broaden the scope of the Series to also include issues of  the sustainability of 
locally managed irrigation and support systems. 
Locally managed  irrigation can be of many types, such as traditional farmer-constructed 
diversion or tank schemes, indigenous and often new lift irrigation, government-constructed 
but  farmer-managed  irrigation  systems  and  systems where  management  is or  has  been 
transferred from an outside agency to a local user organization. 
By ‘‘irrigation management transfer” we mean some degree of  transfer of  responsibility and 
authority for irrigation management from the government to farmer groups or other nongov- 
ernmental entities. This generally involves contraction of  the role of  the state and expansion 
of the role of  the private sector and water users in irrigation management. In other words, there 
is a shifting upstream of  the point where management responsibility and control of the water 
supply is transferred from the irrigation authority to local management. This may involve 
changes in policies, procedures, practices and the performance of irrigated agriculture. It may 
or may not involve “privatization” of  ownership of the assets of  the irrigation system. The 
Short Report Series addresses questions such as the following: 
What are the necessary conditions which support viable locally managed irrigation? 
What socio-technical conditions, institutional arrangements and change processes lead 
to sustainable locally managed irrigation? 
What is the range of different models that are being applied worldwide  for  turnover or 
transfer of responsibility for local management for recently developed irrigation? 
What  are the effects of management transfer on the productivity, profitability,  financial 
viability, equity, eficiency and sustainability of irrigated agriculture? 
What are the perspectives of  farmers, managers, policymakers, urban consumers and 
other stakeholders in irrigated agriculture about irrigation management transfer? 
What adjustments in government may be needed as a result of  turnover to provide 
support to locally managed irrigation system and to improve productivity in the public 
sector? 
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i  - The Short Report Series is produced by the F'rogram  on Local Management of the 
International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI). Support for the Series is provided 
by  Deutsche Gesellschaft  fur Technische Zusammenarbeit  (GTZ) GmbH  through  the 
Privatization and Self-Management of Irrigation Project (No. 91.7860.9-01.288). Individuals 
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Dr. Douglas Vermillion or Dr. Sam H. Johnson 111, 
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Privatization of Irrigation Schemes 
In many countries, irrigation management transfer (MT) involves the transfer of  operation 
and maintenance (O&M) responsibility from a public irrigation authority to a local manage- 
ment organization. Quite often, as the assets of the irrigation system, including the land, belong 
to the government, actual ownership of the infrastructure must remain with the government, 
even though the local management organization is responsible for O&M. 
However,  a  few  countries  are involved  in  IMT ‘programs that  lead  to  complete 
privatization of irrigation scheme assets. The vast majority of these programs involve public 
pump irrigation such as the Salinity Control and Reclamation Project (SCARP) privatization 
program in Pakistan and ongoing deep tubewell privatization projects in various states in India 
and in Bangladesh. 
Due to complex public versus private ownership issues, it is much more unusual to find 
a program where the government is privatizing public surface irrigation schemes. One such 
example is privatization of large-scale public irrigation systems in New Zealand. This program 
is unique in that the government established a value on the assets and then sold the irrigation 
schemes to the water users. 
Within this short report, the section on the sale process is extremely interesting as it 
details the complexities of  such a public ownership to private ownership sale. In the sale 
process, the following aspects were particularly important: (I) the need for new legislation 
giving the government the power to dispose of ownership of the schemes, (2) the inclusion of 
water rights as one of the scheme assets, (3) the determination of sale prices for the scheme 
assets, and (4) the government’s willingness to protect the new owners from future dam safety 
legislation. 
The ability to provide timely information about such  an  important aspect of  local 
management of irrigation is the reason the Short Report Series was created. The editors 
welcome comments and reactions to this and other reports in the Series. 
i 
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- PRIVATIZATION OF IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
Peter J. Farley' 
BACKGROUND 
Physical Setting 
New Zealand lies in the southwest Pacific Ocean and consists of two main islands and a 
number of  smaller islands which cover an area of some 270,000 square kilometers. The 
country is long and nmow and very mountainous, with less than a quarter of the land below 
200 meters above sea level. It has a population of 3.45 million people and has traditionally 
been very dependent on its agricultural industry. Agricultural products constitute nearly 60 
per cent of New Zealand's export earnings. 
Of the 17.45 million hectares of land currently in use, some 13.7 million hectares are 
used  for grazing, with only 0.29 million hectares planted for cropping and horticultural use. 
In 1988, New Zealand had 234.000 hectares of irrigated land, of which some 45 percent was 
supplied by government constructed imgation schemes. The remainder was largely private 
irrigation consisting of individuals or small groups of (up to six) irrigators using primarily 
groundwater. Of the 49  irrigation schemes then  under government ownership, nine were 
situated in the North Island and 40 in the South Island. The South Island irrigation schemes 
fell into two broad geographic groups -  Canterbury and Central Otago -  with quite distinct 
geographic, climatic and land-use conditions. Accordingly, the types of irrigation use are 
different in all three broad locations. 
Agricultural Context 
North Island 
About 2 percent of the total land previously imgated by government schemes is in the North 
Island-approximately 2,270 hectares-in nine imgation schemes. Irrigated land use in the 
North Island schemes is predominantly horticultural (see Annex 1). Recent years have seen 
an increase in the production of fruit and fruit products. most notably in the production of kiwi 
fruit. Irrigated land in the North Island is made up of relatively small blocks with an average 
horticultural scheme being some  90- la0  hectares in size. The  soil in imgated areas  is generally 
of high quality. The whole North Island area typically experiences a mean rainfall in the range 
1  Consulfant, Frame  Group, engaged by the New  Zealand  Treasury to  manage the privatization process. 
-1- of 1,200-1,800 mm. Seasonal rainfall does not vary greatly from year to year, but there are 
frequent critical seasonal deficits. 
The main types of irrigation systems used in the North Island are spray and trickle 
irrigation. Spray or sprinkler irrigation has been used for many years and because of the poor 
efficiency of water-use and labour intensity involved in shifting irrigation pipes there has been 
a trend in sprinkler irrigation systems towards mechanization; a substitution of  capital for 
labor? Trickle irrigation systems have been installed mainly on kiwi fruit, citrus, grape and 
pip fruit3 crops. Most of these fruit crops are dependent on shelter belts, and trickle irrigation 
of shelter belts has doubled the growth rate of these in the first few years. Traditional dripper 
systems are reliant on soil characteristics for good water distribution, although such soils are 
not widespread in New Zealand. However, technological developments have allowed trickle 
systems to be used on shallow and high infiltration rate soils: 
South Island (Canterbury) 
Land use in the Canterbury region is predominantly pastoral (see Annex 1). Irrigated blocks 
of land are much larger than those in the Central Otago region, with an average block size of 
approximately 2,000 hectares. The Canterbury region has soil of a medium quality. While the 
mean annual rainfall for the Canterbury region totals less than 800 mm for the northern and 
central Canterbury areas, and less than 600 mm for southern Canterbury, areas nearer the coast 
often experience mean annual rainfalls between 400-600 mm. Irrigation becomes profitable 
when the mean annual rainfall is less than 750 mm. Spring is often the driest season of the 
year and summer the wettest. 
The Canterbury  region accounts for some 18 of  the previously government-owned 
irrigation schemes. Because of the pastoral nature of  this area the main types of irrigation 
schemes used  are  spray  systems  and border-dykes.  As  a  method  of  surface  irrigation, 
border-dykes have been shown to be the most efficient method with respect to water use and 
labor: a well-designed border-dyke irrigation system irrigates at about 65 percent efficiency. 
Labor requirements for this type of irrigation system are now minimal due to automation? 
South lslnnd (Central Otago) 
Irrigated land in Central Otago accounts for about 25 percent of the total area of land in New 
Zealand irrigated by government schemes. Approximately one half of the irrigated acreage is 
used for sheep grazing. A comparatively small amount of irrigated land is used for horticultural 
production which consists of mainly stone and pip fruits (see Annex 1). 
The Central Otago region has 17 imgation schemes largely developed from water races 
originally constructed for gold mining. Blocks of  irrigated land are reasonably small with 
variable  soil quality. Central Otago has  a  semi-arid climate with  frosty dry winters and 
prolonged hot dry periods during summer and autumn. Mean annual rainfall has a range of 
2  Ministry of Agriculture and Pisheries, December 1989. New Ze~lond  Community lrrigotion  Schemes:  Historicol 
Accounts up to the Compleiion of the 1987/88 Irigarion Scaron, Wellington. 
3  pip fruit in the Nonh Island irrigation schemes consist of apple, pear and nashi pear crops. Pip fruit in Cenwd Otaga 
consists mainly of apple cmps. 
4  Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. December 1989. New  Zealand  Communiry Inigaion Schemes: Historical 
Accounts up to the Complcfion  ofthe 1987B8 Irrigation Searon, Wellington. 
5  ibid,p. 21. 
-2-  ~ 250 to 600 mm with summer being the wettest season. Farming systems in this region are 
dependent on irrigation for three main reasons: extensive sheep and cattle grazing on hill 
country where winter feed is the limitation; intensive sheep and cattle grazing which depend 
on water for summer feed production; and orchard production of  predominantly stone and pip 
The irrigation schemes use either spray irrigation, border-dyking or wild flooding as 
methods of irrigation. Wild flooding involves the use of contour races with sills that allow the 
water to overflow down the hillside at regular intervals. This system is very dependent on the 




Using facilities originally developed for mining, private irrigation began in New Zealand 
during the late 1800s in Central Otago. Government involvement began with the government 
financing theconstruction of 12  schemes in Central Otago between 1910 and 1935  (see Annex 
2). After 1935,  government-financed construction of irrigation projects was extended to other 
areas of  the country. Significant increases in government-irrigated acreage occurred in the 
1930s, and again in the  1960s and 1970s. The increase during the  1930s was a result of 
depression’ public works programs. A second increase in imgated acreage during the 1960s 
and 1970s is attributable to a greater awareness of  the value of irrigation due to several severe 
droughts during that period, concurrent with active promotion of  irrigation construction, 
operation and management by government agencies. Since 1960, the government has sup- 
ported the construction of 26 new irrigation schemes designed to irrigate 73,000 hectares. 
The government eventually constructed a total 40 irrigation schemes in the South Island 
and 9 in the North Island. 
Rationale 
The rationale for government involvement in irrigation development in New Zealand was 
similar to that in both the United States of America and Australia. Irrigation investments were 
considered too large and investment horizons too long for individuals acting alone, while the 
development of the projects was seen to provide employment and an increase in agricultural 
production.8 This rationale is at variance with the fact that a larger area was developed by the 
private sector without subsidy, albeit in generally smaller scale schemes. Such incongruity 




Ministry of Works ,md Developmen6 August 1989.  The Older Central OtagO Irrigation Schemes. Waking Party 
Repon, Alexandra. 
Depression refers to  the  period of worldwide economic depression during the 1930s. 
Wahl. R.W. 1989. Markets.for Federal Wnler. Subsidies. Piopeny Rights, and the Bureau of  Reclmtion  Resources 
for the Future. Washington D.C. and Powell, 1.M. 1989. Watering in !he Garden Stole: Water, LMdd  Community 
in Victoria 1834-19118. Allen and Unwin. 
-3- Economic analysis played little or no role in the construction of the early schemes, and 
later schemes were often justified  by  overly optimistic estimates of project  agricultural 
benefits and underestimates of construction costs. For example, the economic analysis used 
to justify the nine North Island horticultural developments projected a significantly higher 
level of  kiwi fruit prices than could be sustained9 Lower product prices now mean that many 
of the horticultural irrigation projects are, at best, only marginally economically viable. As a 
result of  the decline in prices and the time scale involved in the approval and construction 
process (in many instances this can be a period of between 10  and 25 years), the development 
of irrigable acreage within these projects has also fallen considerably short of the development 
anticipated when the projects were in the design and planning stages. Only about 40 percent 
of  the total irrigable area within the horticultural schemes approved by the government for 
construction since 1980 was being irrigated in 1990. The result was that water sale revenues 
were dramatically less than forecast and unit operating costs considerably higher. 
Role of the Ministry of Works and Development 
From 1912 until 1987 the Ministry of Works and Development (MWD)”  had responsibility 
for the design, construction and operation of government-owned irrigation schemes as well 
as responsibility for recommending annual water charges to the Minister for approval. Over 
its history of involvement with irrigation, the primary objective of  the MWD became to 
continue constructing new or upgrading existing schemes to sustain its design and construction 
force. Continued irrigation was perceived to be in the “national interest” and was pursued by 
the MWD to the extent that financial viability of schemes was a secondary concern.” 
At approximately the time the decision was made to sell the schemes, a separate decision 
was made to change the MWD from a government department to a State-Owned EnterpriseI2 
(Works Corporation). Responsibility for administering the existing schemes prior to sale was 
transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Responsibility for the sale process 
was allocated to the New Zealand Treasury. 
Irrigation Subsidies 
The Public Works Act 191013  (the Act) provided the authorization for construction of the first 
publicly financed irrigation schemes in Central Otago. The Act provided that 100 percent of 
the off-farm constructions costs were paid by  the government, although the annual water 
charges paid by farmers were supposed to cover operation and maintenance (08rM)  costs plus 
the interest costs associated with one-fourth of  the capital. Contracts were supposed to be 
9  NZO40,Wo per hectare Gross Margin, (1989. at which time NZS I =US$0.60). 
10  At various times known as Public Works hpvtment and Ministry of  Works.  In  addition to consuucting inigation 
projecb the MWD designed and built olher public works projects. 
11  Audit Office,  1987. Minislq of  Work  rmd Development: Irri,qalion Schemes. Wellington. 
12  A Government owned company oper24ing on a fully commercial basis. 
13 The number after the title of an  Act is lhe year in which it came into force. 
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non-adjustable agreements between individual irrigators and the government, but this made 
~ 
no provision for costs above budgeted estimates, or for inflation which reached levels of up 
to 18 percent during the 1980s. In general, these contracts were not adjusted until 1973 when 
the government decided to increase water charges by 20 percent per year until O&M charges, 
including substantial accumulated deficits, were covered (see Annex 3). 
Prior to 1975, on-farm distribution works were not funded by  the government. From 
1975 to 1978. the government provided a 33 percent grant for on-farm works. This increased 
to  50 percent in  1978. The government also funded all investigation and  design costs 
throughout the 1912-1986  period. These costs were not included in total scheme construction 
costs. 
All government subsidies to new irrigation schemes were ended in  1987. However, 
schemes which were approved-in-principle at that time have been allowed to proceed although 
the form and amount of government subsidy has been modified in the sales process (e.g., the 
Eamscleugh scheme sale).I4 
Reasons  for Government Divestment 
Of the economic reforms beginning in 1984. the primv  focus was on the agricultural sector 
and virtually all agricultural subsidies were removed.  In 1987, the government decided to 
end  all  subsidies for imgation  (except subsidies on  those  schemes that  were  currently 
committed  for construction or approved-in- rinciple) and to sell all the schemes. This decision 
followed a 1987 report by the Audit Office  which highlighted many of the problems inherent 
with government ownership and management of  irrigation schemes. Primary among these 
problems was a lack of financial and operational accountability  on the part of the MWD. Water 
charges were often set too low to recover 0&M  and capital costs, irrigators played little role 
in the operational decisions that directly affected the magnitude of water charges they faced 
and benefits they received from the project. Furthermore, it was difficult to determine whether 
the nation had benefited from investing in imgation. 
Selling the schemes to the users was seen as the best way to increase the efficiency of 
their operation.  It was also recognized that sale of schemes would remove the significant future 
liabilities the government would have faced associated with the construction of new schemes 
and refurbishing older schemes. For example, it was estimated that the minimum costs to 
rehabilitate the Central Otago schemes to a safe minimum standard was NZ$50 million.17 
A  number  of  different  sale  options were  considered  sale to  irrigators, sale to  a 
state-owned enterprise, sale to local government, sale to other parties, continue government 
ownership, or closure of the schemes. Government decided to sell the schemes on the basis 
that: 
It. .. 
14  A refurbishmnt and extension  proposal WBS king  considered at the time of the Eamscleugb sale. The  sale agreement 
included a NW  3.3  million paymnt to lhe irrigators 10  upgrade the scheme in lieu of the proposed NW 14.5 million 
govern1  scheme, (1989, NZS 1 =US$0.60). 
15  S~dny.  R. and R. Reynolds, 1989.  Fanning  Without Subsidies: New Zeakds  Recent Experience. Minishy of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Government Print Books. 
16  Audit office, 1987. Ministry of  Worlir ad Developmenl: Irrigafion Schemes, Wellington. 
17  LewIhwaite. W.I. and G.N. Martin, September 1987.  Review of  Erirting  Community Irrigation Schemes in New 
Zealadwith a View to the Future, prepared for the Minister of Woks and Development, Wellington. 
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the schemes were to be sold on a “commercial” basis;’* 
preference be given to selling the schemes to irrigators, because of political and 
monopoly issues; and 
if  irrigators were not interested in purchasing the scheme then the government 
would sell the scheme to others on terms not better than  those offered to the 
irrigators. 
* 
This  sale  strategy was essentially an  attempt to maximize the efficient  use of  the 
irrigation assets and water resources within perceived equity and regulatory restraints. 
Perceptions of Stakeholders 
As a stakeholder in the irrigation schemes, government faced a situation of multiple account- 
abilities. On one hand, there was strong pressure from vested interests to continue developing 
irrigation schemes supposedly for the public good, while on  the other hand, there was an 
obligation  on them to  invest taxpayer’s  money wisely. Another  aspect  was government 
involvement in procedures to obtain water rights where it was required to act both as an 
advocate for imgation use and as an advocate for conservation. Additionally, the process of 
setting water charges was politically contentious and often unrelated to financial viability. 
Farmers frequently stated that the charges were set too high for farms to remain viable, 
while officials believed the charges to be too low to recover capital costs associated with the 
schemes. The whole issue regarding water charges and capital costs came to a head in 1987 
when the Cabinet made the decision to privatize the irrigation schemes. At that stage irrigation 
schemes had come to be regarded by the government as very poor investments that involved 
large amounts of highly politicized decision-making. 
As the government department responsible for the irrigation schemes after 1988, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MA0  also faced dual accountabilities (prior to 1988 
MAF had played a purely advisory role involving advising on the economics of  irrigation 
schemes). MAF perceived its main focus as being to provide a good service to irrigators within 
the constraints of prescriptive legislation. After assuming full responsibility for the schemes 
in 1988, MAF encountered some difficulty with the newly corporatized Works Corporation 
in their contractual responsibilities with respect to the consultation process with irrigators. 
Works Corporation saw their responsibilities more in terms of the specific requirements of 
the management contracts. whereas MAF expected the corporation to undertake vaguely 
specified consultation in a typical bureaucratic substitution for real accountability. Irrigators 
were similarly unprepared for sub-contracted management by a commercial agency. Over the 
last five years, MAF has perceived their relationship with irrigators as being  satisfactory 
although it was somewhat strained during the sale negotiation and settlement process. 
In general Territorial Local Authorities opposed the sale of  the schemes to users and 
advocated sales to themselves. This was universally opposed by users. Farmers’ responses to 
the  1987 proposal to sell the imgation schemes varied initially. While farmers in  some 
18  Based on  expected cash flows to govemmenl  under continued government ownership. 
-6- schemes were very keen to purchase, others were concerned that the sales were an attempt to 
foist liabilities on them, especially in light of the substantial levels of debt that some schemes 
had incurred. As settlements proceeded, however, the initial suspicions faded and the emphasis 
changed to the terms of sale rather than the policy of sale. 
The Sale Process 
The approach taken was to sell the government-owned schemes, including all headworks,” 
on an “as is, where is” basis with the purchaser being given aperiod of statutory access rights” 
to enable them to complete at their own cost, matters such as the definition and registration 
of access rights which would otherwise have to have been done by the government. 
The sale process did not involve altering the nature of the water rights held by schemes 
except to limit the term of any water right to its current term or to 30 years, which ever was 
less. Access rights were also preserved. 
Irrigators were invited to indicate their interest in negotiations and were sent copies of 
scheme accounts, a scheme valuation model, and scheme production data. A meeting was held 
to discuss the data and the process by which an agreed settlement could be reached. The sale 
procedure provided that in the event of agreement not being reached by negotiation the parties 
would refer the issue to final offer arbitration. In the event that the irrigators did not wish to 
purchase at the arbitrated price then the government would seek other buyers at a price not 
less than that offered to the irrigators. Negotiated agreement was reached in all cases and it 
was unnecessary to use the arbitration mechanism. 
Water Rights 
Prior to the sale of  irrigation schemes there were three types of water right in existence: 
Ordinary Water  Rights 
These were granted by the local water authority”  under the Soil Conservation and 
Rivers Control Act 1941 after a process of public notifications and hearings on terms 
and conditions as decided by the authority. Decisions could be appealed through the 
courts.  In  times of  water  shortage, the water  authority had  the power  to direct 
reductions in use. The term of these rights was usually of the order of five years. 
19  Headwork are  intakes and  storage srmctllres  as well as distribution ~Vucluns  thal serve more than one  irrigator group. 
20  Access rights givc the legal right to  enter other pple’r  propeny for consrmction purposes or for operation and 
maintenance of irrigation schemes. Ensuring access rights during the sales pmceu was panicuLvly important to ensure 
hat  operation and mainenance procedures were able to be ded  OUI. 
21  Catchment Boards, Catchment Authorities and. since local govemmnt reorganization in 1990, Regional Councils 
-7- Government Water Rights 
These were rights that the government could, in effect, grant to itself, where projects 
were considered to he in the national interest, without having to apply to the local 
water authority and without any person having rights to appeal. The term of such 
rights was usually in the order of 20 years. 
Mining Rights 
These were mining privileges in respect of water granted under the Mining Act 1926. 
These were granted for periods of up to 30 years but were perpetually renewable. In 
effect, they were permanent property rights to water although tradeahility was limited 
by the fact that the rights could not he sold separately form the land which they served, 
Mining rights were specified by volume and priority”  at the time of issue. 
As the schemes were sold as going concerns, the water rights were included as one of 
the scheme assets. There was no attempt to use the sale process to extend or modify water 
rights except to set a limit of 30 years on the Mining Rights. In some cases, major schemes 
faced applying for new water rights within two years of  the sale. This issue was addressed by 
allowing for the expected costs of applying for renewal of the rights when negotiating the sale 
price. 
Sale Prices 
Very few of the schemes yielded a high sale price to the government (see Annex 2).  The key 
reason forthis was the low net revenue generated by the schemes under government ownership 
and management.  Other limitations resulted from the liabilities accepted by  the scheme 
purchasers. Government gave greater priority to transferring ownership to existing irrigators 
and removing the ongoing liability to fund future rehabilitation work than to achieving a high 
sale price. In cases where the government made payments to purchasers, the payments were 
generally for construction work the government had agreed to perform at some point in the 
future, or for refurbishment work necessary to maintain the scheme’s viability or safety. 
The sale process was also constrained by a number of other significant factors. First, 
there was an absence of competitive bidders because schemes were effectively only sold to 
irrigators. This was done primarily to minimize monopoly  and regulatory questions that 
would have arisen if schemes had heen sold to a party other than the irrigators. However, if 
the sale process had heen open to any buyer, few alternative buyers would have been likely 
to emerge (except perhaps local governments). This was simply a factor of the low economic 
value of the schemes. Secondly, the sale process was governed by political considerations 
and the desire of the government to signal their determination to  sell the schemes. These 
factors combined to weaken the government’s negotiating position and lower the sale prices 
obtained. 
22  When demand for water exceeded availability. the lowest pnority users had to stop drawing water. This provided  B 
clear self-policing system and  resulted in rights being valued in line with their priority. 
-8- Other issues which were raised in the course of establishing the sale process included 
dam  public access and recreation, water right terms, statutory easements, and the 
need to amend the definition of “natural water” under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
1967. Most of these additional issues were resolved without the need for special legislation. 
The  Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 
Prior to the Irrigation Schemes Act 1990, the legislative basis for the government to develop 
and manage irrigation schemes was provided by the Public Works Act 198  1. As this contained 
no authority for the government to dispose of its ownership of the schemes, new legislation 
was needed. In December 1988,  government agreed to the drafting of legislation for enactment 
in August 1989. Owing to Legislative delays, it was July 1990 before the irrigation schemes 
act was  passed.24 However, the first irrigation scheme sale agreement was approved by 
government in June 1989. 
The Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 (the Act) empowered the government to dispose of 
its irrigation schemes.”  The objective of the Act was to eliminate all statutory provisions for 
irrigation and transfer existing rights held by the government for the operation of the schemes 
in a registrable form. The Act recognized that this process would take some time, especially 
with respect to land rights and consequently legislation allows for a five-year period from the 
passing of the Act for access rights to be registered. Matters provided for in the Act include 
authority to sell the schemes: provision for the transfer of  existing registered easements and 
rights to the purchasers: and provision for the transfer of existing government-held water rights 
and privileges to the purchasers?6 
Performance Results of  Schemes under New Ownership 
The extent of the actual efficiency gains from private ownership cannot yet be determined. 
However, the evidence gathered to date from the few schemes that were controlled and 
operated by irrigators prior to sale indicates that these gains can be substantial. 
23  Irrigaton were canmed  that future dam safety legislation (which wasn’t at that stage being mooted) might not only 
render their schemes nonviable in a financial sense, but also impase substantial liabilities for decommissioning dams. 
A provision was included in all of the Sale and Purchase  agreements between the  government and all irrigators where 
significant dam were involved, to the effect that if dam safety legislation was enacted within bn  years and had a 
materially adverse effect on the financial viability of schemes, the  assets ca  be handed back to the government. thus 
leaving any residual decommissioning costs with the government. 
24  Delays in passing the  legislation had a number of consequences including disputes between offcials and the irrigators 
as to their rights and  obligations in the hansition period (especially with respect to activities such  as collecting water 
charges);frushatioiifo~th~se~gaton  whoiwdnegotia~dagncmentsintheerpectationfhatthevansferofownenhip 
was imminent: and some payment dates specified in sale and purchase  agreements being missed.  As a result of the 
delays, the Cmwn incumd penalty inamt  on  money which it had contmcted to pay irrigation companies within a set 
period qhe  Audit Office, luly 1991. The Process for Disposal of Crown Funded Im’galion Schemes, Wellington). 
25  New Zealand Govemmenl, July 1990. An Ac1 lo empower the Crown lo dispose of irrigalion schemes (The lrrigotion 
Schemes Acr, 1990). Wellington. 
26  Hansnrd 1990. fnigmion Schentes Bill, SecondReading, 28 June 1990, Parlimnmy  Records. 
-9- For example, the Greenstreet Scheme in Canterbury was constructed with a 50 percent 
government subsidy, but has been independently operated and maintained by irrigators since 
completion in 1975. In 199OZ7  it had an annual water charge of NZ$3.50/ha and cash reserves 
of NZ$5.50/ha.  Adjacent schemes operated by the government had water charges of around 
NZ$  12ha  and accumulated debts of the order of NZ$50/ha. The Bannockburn Scheme is 
small and one of  the oldest in Central Otago. It has been operated by the irrigators for many 
years. Water charges in 1990 were about NZ$l8/ha and it had no debts. Government operated 
schemes in the region had water charges of NZ$43 to NZ$79/ha and large debts. 
The Hawea scheme was completed in 1967 and operated until 1988 by the MWD. Since 
the irrigators have assumed responsibility for operation and maintenance, operating costs have 
fallen by approximately two-thirds. The Maniototo scheme was truncated after massive cast 
escalations, because the estimated costs for MWD to complete the last 3,000 hectares of the 
scheme was NZ$ 11.5 million. Irrigators in the truncated area were paid NZ$ 1.5 million in 
compensation. They then completed the scheme themselves early in 1990 for less than NZ$ 
1.5 million. 
Reports are now being received of similar results being achieved by the schemes which 
have been sold. There appear to be several sources of efficiency gain from direct irrigator 
ownership. One of the main areas for efficiency gain is in the psychology of ownership, which 
has meant  that  irrigators take personal interest  and responsibility for the structures  and 
operation of the scheme. They are also exposed to maximum incentives to control msts, 
recover charges and invest prudently. 
Control of  irrigation schemes at a local level has resulted in increased operating cost 
efficiency and equityJ8  Reviews and decisions made at the local level are more acceptable to 
users and have proven to be much more efficient than centrally directed programs. As well as 
this, the move away from government controlled water charges has meant that irrigation 
companies are able to operate competitively in the allocation and pricing of water as a valuable 
resource. 
Other areas that have been noted by Treasuryz9 as sources of  potential for efficiency 
gains include reduced amounts of over elaborate engineering design and specification as was 
the case with the Maniototo example noted above: the removal of high overhead costs of 
government and Local Authorities: economic evaluations undertaken by the risk takers and 
not by a remote government agency; and removing the separation of capital fund raising and 
risk for the promoters. Overall, there have been substantial benefits to both the government 
and the irrigators. 
Summary 
The government  role  in irrigated  agriculture  in  New  Zealand  has  evolved  from 
government control over the design, construction, and operation of irrigation schemes to the 
sale of government-constructed schemes to private parties. The primary rationale for transfer 
27  At which time NZS 1 = US$O.M). 
28  Subsidies are MI longer provided to groups or individuals who are most effective at political lobbying at lhe expense 
29  The Treasury, 18 August  1989.  Disposul of  Communiry lrrigorion Schemes:  Issues,  Appendix One. Ministerid 
of orher producers. 
briefing paper. 
-10-  I of ownership was to improve the efficiency of  their operation and to  reduce costs to the 
government. Between  1988-90.49 government-owned irrigation schemes in New Zealand 
were sold to private irrigators.30  The sale took place against a backdrop of wider economic 
reform and the elimination of  agricultural subsidies. 
While the sales did not produce significant revenue to the government there was a major 
reduction in government liabilities. Private irrigators demonstrated a willingness to take direct 
control and responsibility for the assets that provided them with benefits. Indications are that 
efficiency  gains in the order of 30-50  percent are being achieved as a result of the privatization 
of the schemes. Further opportunities for efficiency gains now lies with the introduction of a 
system of  transferable water rights between existing and potential users. While the water is 
tied to the irrigation schemes users are not forced to consider its full economic value. 
Key Lessons 
*  Government involvement in irrigation has not been  shown to produce any net 
national benefit and there are strong reasons to suspect that it has resulted in a net 
loss of national welfare. 
Privatization  of  irrigation schemes in  New  Zealand has produced  very  large 
efficiency gains. 
Although irrigators were acutely aware of the frustration’s and inefficiency of 
government ownership and management, many initially feared that they would be 
worse off with a loss of  government support. 
Government  agencies whose existence depends on  contracting and managing 
irrigation schemes will not advocate or enthusiastically support privatization. 
Privatization should be carried out by an independent body with authority to access 
information and act upon it. 
Irrigator-owned schemes operate satisfactorily under normal commercial law and 
institutional forms. In New Zealand, special legislative structures and systems 
were not required. 
The  privatization of imgation schemes in New Zealand has been a very successful, 






30  Of the  schemes, 41 were sold to  groups (45 ordinary companies. one cooperative company and one incorparafed 
society). one was sold to the sole user, and one was sold to  users  joinlly who then toak over individual pam. 
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Annex 1 
Land Use on Crown-Owned Irrigation Schemes 
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Total Scheme Usage  67%  9%  1%  3%  11%  3% 
Note; Within the areas of  the irrigation schemes there is the capacity to imgate 
a further 40,437 hectares. The development of this land for irrigation is 
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